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Abstract
We develop a model to study the e¤ects of migration and remittances on
inequality in the origin communities. While wealth inequality is shown to
be monotonically reduced along the time-span, the short- and the long-run
impacts on income inequality may be of opposite signs, suggesting that the
dynamic relationship between migration/remittances and inequality may well
be characterized by an inverse U-shaped pattern. This is consistent with the
…ndings of the empirical literature, yet o¤ers a di¤erent interpretation from
the usually assumed migration network e¤ects. With no need to endogenize
migration costs through the role of migration networks, we generate the same
result via intergenerational wealth accumulation.
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11 Introduction
Does international migration increase or decrease economic inequality in de-
veloping (sending) countries? What are the possible forces that may decide
whether there exists a positive or a negative relationship between the two?
These are important issues because inequality is an outcome of interest in
its own right and because the distribution of income conditions the extent to
which liquidity constraints impinge on investment in physical and human cap-
ital.1 Consequently, the growth-enhancing potential of international migration
largely depends on its distributional impact. A series of recent studies cov-
ering a large sample of developing countries have demonstrated the growth
potential of migration in a context of capital market imperfections, with remit-
tances and savings accumulated abroad relaxing credit constraints on farm in-
vestment (Lucas, 1987, Rozelle et al., 1999), education (Hanson and Woodruff,
2003, Cox Edwards and Ureta, 2003) and investment in micro-enterprises (e.g.,
Mesnard and Ravallion, 2001, Dustmann and Kirchkamp, 2002, Woodruff and
Zenteno, 2006). However, there are also studies pointing to more negative ef-
fects of remittances and migration on investment, be it because remittances are
mainly consumed (Rempel and Lobdell, 1978), generate moral hazard prob-
lems leading to lower effort or labor force participation (Azam and Gubert,
2005) or because migration may in some circumstances depress educational
attainments of children (McKenzie and Rapoport, 2006a).2
The empirical literature on the migration-inequality relationship does not
offer decisive conclusions as to whether international migration in general, and
migrants’ remittances in particular, increase or decrease economic inequality at
origin. This lack of consensus may be attributed to the diversity of the envi-
ronmentsstudiedaswellastodifferencesintheempiricalapproachesadopted:
static versus dynamic models, with and without endogenous migration costs,
1See the pionneeing contributions of Banerjee and Newman, 1993, Galor and Zeira, 1993,
Aghion and Bolton, 1997; see also Bardhan, Bowles and Gintis (1999) for a survey including addi-
tional channels.
2See Rapoport and Docquier (2006) for a survey of this literature.
2and different conceptions about whether remittances must be treated as a sub-
stitute for domestic earnings (in which case the effect of migration on domestic
income sources must also be taken into account). There is however a general
sense in the literature that the impact of migration and remittances on eco-
nomic inequality is likely to vary over time and display an inverse U-shaped
pattern. The underlying assumption is that international migration may be
viewed as a diffusion process with decreasing information costs thanks to the
roleofmigrationnetworks: sincemigrationcostsareinitiallyhighincommuni-
ties lacking migration experience, only households at the middle of the income
and wealth distribution have both the incentives and the means to send mem-
bers abroad; as these relatively afﬂuent households beneﬁt from additional re-
mittance income, inequality at ﬁrst increases; however, early migrants may
supply information and assistance to future migrants from their hometown,
thus making migration affordable to households at the lower end of the distri-
bution and allowing for a decrease in inequality.
In this paper, we propose a dynamic theoretical framework that goes part of
the way towards reconciling the conﬂicting results from empirical studies and
complements the ”networks” view in showing that the same predictions may
be obtained with exogenous (i.e., constant) migration costs. While previous
literature has examined the relationship between migration and inequality in
static, partial equilibrium frameworks, we investigate the impact of migration
on income and inequality both via the direct effect of migrants’ households
increasing their income via higher wages abroad and also the indirect effects
of the outbound ﬂow of individuals on the local labor market, and do so in
a way that demonstrates the importance of the pre-migration distribution of
wealth in determining the impact of migration on the dynamic path and long
run levels of income and wealth inequality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the re-
lated literature on migration, remittances and inequality. In Section 3 we build
a model with two classes of agents characterized by different non-liquiﬁable
3capital endowments, which result in different levels of productivity. In the ru-
ral regions, these endowments generally take the form of a plot of land, the
quality and the quantity of which determine a household’s agricultural pro-
ductivity, as well as its income potential and migration incentives. Familial
wealth is accumulated over time; it is saved from one generation’s disposable
income plus wealth and transmitted to the next generation. Obviously, migra-
tion incentives are stronger for poor households, but rich households are less
constrained; as a result, the exact composition of migration ﬂows in terms of
social origin is a priori unclear.3 In Sections 4 and 5, we ﬁrst characterize differ-
ent regimes of high, higher-medium, lower-medium, and low initial inequali-
ties that condition the dynamics of migration and inequality in the migrants’
origin communities. Then, we investigate how migration and remittances af-
fect the evolution of wealth and income inequalities both at the beginning of
transition and at the steady state. We show that migration and remittances al-
ways lower wealth inequality. In contrast, although income inequality is also
reduced in the long run, it may either increase or decrease in the short run, de-
pendingontheinitialdistributionofendowments. Thatistosay, theshort-and
the long-run effects on the income distribution may be of opposite signs and
display an inverse U-shaped relationship. In Section 6, we extend the model
by introducing a local labor market into our agricultural economy. We still ob-
serve an inverse U-shaped relationship, but only in an originally impoverished
economy when both types of households have very low levels of productivity.
Moreover, with the presence of this inverse U-shaped curve, we ﬁnd that mi-
gration and remittances are likely to worsen the income inequality for good.
Finally, Section 7 presents the conclusions.
3Migrations decisions may also be affected by the level of information on foreign opportunities,
which may be related to skills and income, or by incentive compatibility constraints (e.g., wealthy
households have a stronger enforcement power to secure remittance through inheritance - see for
example Hoddinott, 1994). These aspects are not dealt with in this paper.
42 Related Literature
As mentioned in the previous section, the results from empirical studies on
the migration-inequality relationship are mixed. For example, Adams (1989)
found that international migration tends to worsen economic inequality in
rural Egypt, while the same author found a neutral effect in rural Pakistan
(Adams, 1992). In the case of rural Mexico, Taylor and Wyatt (1996) showed
that remittances are distributed almost evenly across income groups, hence in-
ducing a direct equalizing effect in terms of economic inequality. In addition,
they also showed that remittances have the highest shadow value for house-
holds at the middle-to-low-end of the income distribution; for such households
indeed, remittanceseaseaccesstoproductiveassets(land)and/orcomplemen-
tary inputs; a second equalizing effect is thereby obtained. This suggests that
the impact of remittances on rural development depends not only on the ini-
tial distribution of wealth in the origin community, but also on a host of fac-
tors affecting their shadow value (e.g., degree of liquidity of land rights, costs
of complementary inputs, availability of local labor, etc.). In their study of
remittances to a small coastal city of Nicaragua, Barham and Boucher (1998)
also ﬁnd that remittances decrease income inequality, but only when domes-
tic income sources are treated as exogenous; after constructing different no-
migration counterfactuals to control for self-selection into migration and local
labor-force participation, they show instead that remittances increase income
inequality; this is explained by the fact that the potential home earnings of
erstwhile migrants have a more equalizing effect on income distribution than
remittances.
The impact of remittances on economic inequality, however, needs not be
monotonic. Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki (1986) suggested that the dynamics of
remittances and inequality may be represented by an inverse U-shaped rela-
tionship along the lines described above. Their analysis was based on the
decomposition of a Gini index of household income by income sources, tak-
5ing into account the correlations between different income components. The
method was applied to household data from two Mexican villages, one with a
relatively recent Mexico-to-US migration experience, and one with a longer mi-
gration history. The distributional impact of remittances was shown to depend
on the village’s migration history, which implicitly captures the magnitude of
migration costs.4 They showed that income dispersion was decreased in both
villages once migrants’ remittances were taken into account, but more so in
the village characterized by a longer migration tradition. With a similar ap-
proach applied to Yugoslavia, Milanovic (1987) also tested for the possibility
of such a trickle-down effect. Using data from the 1973, 1978 and 1983 Yu-
goslavian household surveys, Milanovic found no empirical support for this
hypothesis: remittances were shown to raise income inequality throughout the
period, and more so for agricultural households. Taylor’s (1992) longitudi-
nal study of a Mexican village also shows that remittances may well have an
inequality-enhancing effect in the short-run and yet contribute to decrease in-
come inequality in the long-run as poor rural households gradually transform
remittance income into productive assets.
Finally, McKenzie and Rapoport (2006b) examine the overall impact of mi-
gration on inequality in a large number of Mexican rural communities. This
impact is composed of the direct and the indirect (e.g., multiplier) effects of
remittances, and other potential spillover and general equilibrium effects of
migration. They conﬁrm that Mexican immigrants to the United States come
from the middle of the asset wealth distribution, with the migration probability
displaying an inverse-U shaped relationship with wealth. The presence of mi-
gration networks, both at the family and at the community level, is found to in-
crease the likelihood of migration, which accords with their ability to raise the
expected beneﬁts and lower the costs of migration, and to generate a Kuznets-
4Treating migration costs as exogenous may be adapted to situations where they mainly include
transportation and border crossing expenditures, but is clearly unsatisfactory when information
costs (e.g., search process for a destination, and a job at destination) are substantial; in this case, it is
well known that migration costs tend to decrease as the size of the relevant network at destination
increases. Suchnetworkeffectshaveﬁrstbeenrecognizedinthesociologicalliterature(e.g, Massey
et al., 1994) and, more recently, in the economic literature (Carrington et al., 1996, Munshi, 2003).
6type relationship between migration and inequality. Indeed, migration ap-
pears to increase inequality at low levels of community migration prevalence
and then to reduce inequality at high levels of migration prevalence.
3 The Benchmark Model
In this section, we lay out the basic framework of our model in the closed
economy, that is, without access to migration. We consider a rural economy,
where each household is engaged in self-sustaining agricultural production
(i.e., no exchange of labor or goods). There are two classes of households:
low-productivity (LP) and high-productivity (HP), whose difference originates
from the quantity and quality of their inherited and non-liquiﬁable familial
land. These characteristics are captured by a technological parameter α, which
equals to α for HP households and to α for LP households, with α > α > 1. De-
spite its productivity level, every household consists of the same given number
of one-period-lived agents. Without loss of generality, this number, or the size
of each household, is normalized to unity.
Next, we assume a quadratic production function for each family.5 We
write:




where lt ∈ [0,1] is the amount of household labor used on own farm. The neg-
ative term captures the decreasing marginal productivity of labor. For mathe-
matical convenience, it is assumed that the scale parameter α only affects the
linear term.
Since we are primarily interested in the characterization of inter-household
inequality and not in the intra-household distribution of income, we assume
that the familial income is equally shared between the members of a given
5With a quadratic function, the marginal productivity of labor is bounded from above. This
avoids unrealistic solutions where a very small proportion of household members stays in the
familial farm with a very high marginal productivity.
7household. With homogeneous agents, each household maximizes its utility
according to the following Cobb-Douglas function:
ut = (xt − xm)1−σbσ
t+1
s.t. xt + bt+1 = yt + bt
where xt is the level of consumption, xm is the subsistence level (it is assumed
that xm < α − 1
2), bt is the wealth inherited from the previous generation and
bt+1 is the bequest left to the next generation. σ ∈]0,1[ is the parameter indicat-
ing preferences between consumption and bequests. Lastly, yt is the amount of
household income. The usual utility maximization leads to
xt = (1 − σ)(yt + bt) + σxm
bt+1 = σ(yt + bt − xm)
In a closed economy, there is no access to migration so that the sole source
of familial income is the household agricultural production: yt = qt.6 Given
our utility function, the maximization of utility is equivalent to maximizing
income. Since we assume that productivity levels of both types are greater
than 1, we obtain l∗
t = 1 for both types of household (i.e., everybody works),
and
yt = α −
1
2
; bt+1 = σ(α −
1
2
− xm + bt)
From our assumptions that (i) σ ∈]0,1[ and (ii) bt+1(0) > 0, we know there
exists a unique and stable steady state for the linear function bt+1(bt). At the
steady state,










6In section 6, we will introduce a local labor market, but for the time being, it is assumed that
there is no exchange amongst households.
84 Open Economy: with Access to Migration
Let us now assume that after this rural society evolves into its steady state in
the closed economy, for some exogenous and unexpected reason, there is a mi-
gration possibility to a high-wage foreign destination from period t = 1.7 The
foreign wage per migrant, w∗, is given (i.e., the home country or region is small
enough to keep wages at destination unaffected by migration).8 Meanwhile,
each migrant incurs a ﬁxed and positive amount of migration costs denoted by
c. Due to the absence of credit markets, migration costs must be ﬁnanced at the
beginning of each period with the family’s accumulated wealth.
The familial motivation for sending out migrants is to increase total family
income, and thus household utility. Migration by some members is an implicit
familial arrangement involving: (i) collective ﬁnancing of migration costs, and
(ii) remittances from the migrants to the remaining household members. Note
that we rule out the possibility for remittances to be invested in land or in any
other productive asset. This has two justiﬁcations. First, as detailed above, the
empirical literature on the impact of remittances on investment is mixed, with
some studies showing that remittances can alleviate liquidity constraints that
impede investment in different forms of capital and other studies emphasizing
instead their depressing effect on investment. Second and maybe more impor-
tantly, migration is assumed to be the only possibility of investment for domes-
tic households. However, the economic impact of the investment in ”migrants”
is by no means different from the impact of investment in other productive as-
sets. In our dynamic framework, previous migration ﬂows allow households
to accumulate wealth, which further increases the number of migrants they can
afford. Introducing an alternative and substitutable form of investment would
generate similar qualitative predictions on the dynamics of inequality, both in
the short-run and in the long-run.
7In fact, we can open the frontier at any period without altering our inequality analysis. Our
assumption is made to facilitate the proofs of the propositions presented in section 5.
8The foreign wage is the same for all migrants because we assume that they are homogeneous
agents. The difference in agricultural productivity between the HP and the LP household members
comes from their inherited land and has nothing to do with agent-speciﬁc characters.
9With these understandings, let mt be the number of migrants in HP house-
holds and mt for that in LP households. Each household is therefore subjected
to a liquidity constraint as follows:
c · mt ≤ bt and c · mt ≤ bt, ∀ t ≥ 1
4.1 LP Household’s Migration Decision
We assume w∗ − c > α, or the net-of-migration-cost foreign wage is greater
than the highest level of marginal productivity for the LP household. Hence,
if there is no liquidity constraint, the LP household will choose to have all its
family members migrating to earn foreign wages, (mnc
t = 1). In order to avoid
such unrealistic situations where a certain type of household fully disappears
from the local economy, we impose the following condition:9
bt < c, ∀ t ≥ 1
which implies that, due to a binding liquidity constraint, there are always some
members of the LP household who stay behind for the agricultural production.






The income of LP households now comes from agricultural production as
well as from received foreign wage:
y

















9Although based on our assumption of one-period-living agent, there seems to be no need
to distinguish between permanant and temporary migration, our model still better portrays the
picture of temporary migration, such as guest worker programs, where migration usually involves
only part of a household and the migrated members send back home considerable amount of their
earned wages.
10Based on our assumptions, we ﬁnd that y
t is strictly increasing in bt. This is
an intuitive result which says that, when a LP household is less bound by the
liquidity constraint, more family members will be able to work abroad, which
generates a higher net reward than working on the familial farm.
Due to the change in sources of income, the decision rule of bequest is no
longer linear in the bequeathed wealth, as shown in Section 3. Instead, it be-















Our assumptions indicate that (i) the function bt+1(bt) is strictly increasing and
strictly concave, and (ii) bt+1(0) is positive. Thereby, there exists a unique pos-
itive stable steady state. With proper restriction on the parameters, this steady
state satisﬁes the liquidity constraint b
m
ss < c.
Lemma 1 If the intergenerational altruistic parameter σ is sufﬁciently small such
that σ < c
w∗−xm, then for equation (3) there exists a real-numbered stable steady state
b
m










(w∗ − α −
c
σ






Proof. See Appendix A.
114.2 HP Household’s Migration Decision
With migration possibilities, the HP households face the following maximiza-
tion problem: ∀t ≥ 1,
max
{mt≥0}
yt = α(1 − mt) −
(1 − mt)2
2
+ mt(w∗ − c)
s.t.
8
> > > > <







Using the Kuhn-Tucker formulation and excluding the situation where m∗
t = 1
(for the same reason as with the LP households), we obtain the migration rates
respectively for the following scenarios.
First, when α ≥ 1 + w∗ − c, even the lowest level of marginal productivity
on family farm (α − 1) is no less than the net-of-migration-cost foreign wage.
Therefore, the HP households do not have any incentive to send abroad their
family members: m∗
t = 0.
Second, when α ≤ w∗ − c, the HP households face a similar situation as do
the LP households. That is, since the highest level of marginal productivity α
is no greater than the net-of-migration-cost foreign wage, the HP households
have incentives to send out all family members. For the same reason as for the
LP households, their liquidity constraint is assumed to be always binding (i.e.
bt < c, ∀t ≥ 1). Thus, m∗
t = bt
c ∈]0,1[.
Lastly, when w∗−c < α < 1+w∗−c, the net-of-migration-cost foreign wage
lies somewhere between the highest and the lowest levels of marginal produc-
tivity for the HP households. Hence, the HP households have an incentive to
send out part of their family members, but not all. We ﬁnd that, without liquid-
ity constraint, the optimal number of migrants is mnc
t = (1+w∗−c−α) ∈]0,1[.
Nevertheless, depending on our choices of parameter values, the HP house-
holds could be either liquidity-constrained or not. The following are the three
possible settings:
12• If c(1 + w∗ − c − α) ≤ b1 ≤ b
m
ss, the HP households are never liquidity-
constrained. Thus, m∗
t = 1 + w∗ − c − α.
• If b1 < c(1 + w∗ − c − α) ≤ b
m
ss, the HP households are liquidity-
constrained in the beginning of the open economy, so m∗
t = bt
c . With
the accumulation of family wealth, however, the HP households will





. From then on, m∗
t =1 + w∗ − c − α.
• If b1 ≤ b
m




In fact, whether a migration decision falls into one of these three settings is
decided by the level of α.
Lemma 2 For all α ∈ ]w∗ − c,1 + w∗ − c[, there are three types of migration deci-
sions depending on α:
• ∀ α ≥ α1, m∗
t = 1 + w∗ − c − α.
• ∀ α ∈ [α0,α1[, m∗
t = bt
c for all t < min
©




t = 1 + w∗ − c − α.
• ∀ α < α0, m∗
t = bt
c .















Proof. See Appendix B.
Since migration decisions alter a households’ income level, which subse-
quently changes the dynamics of wealth accumulation, we can now use the
above derived optimal rates of migration to categorize different cases of in-
come and wealth dynamics.
13(i) High Inequality Case: α ≥ 1 + w∗ − c
In this case, m∗
t = 0, so the income and the wealth levels of the HP house-
holds remain at the steady state of the closed economy: ∀t ≥ 1,










(ii) Higher-Medium Inequality Case: α1 ≤ α < 1 + w∗ − c
In this case, m∗
t = 1 + w∗ − c − α. Therefore,
yt =















Based on our assumptions that (i) σ ∈]0,1[ and (ii) bt+1(bt = 0) > 0, there














(iii) Lower-Medium Inequality Case: α0 ≤ α < α1
In the beginning of this case, m∗
t = bt
c , so both the income and wealth
dynamics follow the same patterns as in the low inequality case that will be
clariﬁed below. However, as soon as the liquidity constraint is overcome and
so m∗
t = 1 + w∗ − c − α, the dynamics switch to what have been described in
the higher-medium inequality case.
(iv) Low Inequality Case: α < α0
In this case, m∗
t = bt
c . Hence,























Based on the same reasons as for equation (3), there exists a real-numbered
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c
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As emphasized above, we focus in this paper on inter-household inequality
rather than on intra-household inequality. For this reason, we assume an equal-
sharing rule for family income, meaning that remittances sent per migrant are
such that they equalize income per-member across migrants and non-migrants
in a given household. Hence, the equilibrium amount of remittances is given
by the difference between the average income of a household and the domes-
tic income per member in the home region. Since migration costs are equally
shared within a household, the amount received by each remaining member















This is the product of two terms: the migration rate and the averaged-income
gap between migrants and remaining HP household members.
Rewriting the general expression above for each case, we have for the LP
households rt =
bt
c (w∗ − α + 1
2 −
bt
2c), and for the HP households,10 in the
10In order to have a positive level of remittances in all cases, we need to impose extra conditions
on the parameters. However, whether these conditions hold or not does not change our later
15(i)
1. High inequality case: rt = 0
2. Higher-medium inequality case: rt = (1 + w∗ − c − α)(w
∗+c−α
2 )
3. Lower-medium inequality case:
rt = bt
c (w∗ − α + 1
2 − bt
2c), ∀ bt < c(1 + w∗ − c − α)
rt = (1 + w∗ − c − α)(w
∗+c−α
2 ), ∀ bt ≥ c(1 + w∗ − c − α)
4. Low inequality case: rt = bt
c (w∗ − α + 1
2 − bt
2c)
5 The effect of migration and remittances on inter-
household inequality
We have seen so far that migration to a high-wage destination enables rural
households to raise their average income via (i) a rise in farm productivity, and
(ii) remittances from migrated family members. This change in income subse-
quently alters the inter-household inequalities of income and wealth. Below,
we will characterize this alteration in the short and the long runs in each case,
but before doing so, let us deﬁne the measures that we use to evaluate inter-
household inequality:11










analysis on inequality. Thus, even though it only consists of a small set of parameter values (a
subset of (c ≤ 1), or when migration costs are very low), we tolerate this peculiar situation where
the remaining household subsidizes the migrated members because migration results in higher
average returns on the domestic farm than overseas.
11Note that the wealth level at each period is chosen by the previous generation.



















5.1 High Inequality Case
In this case, we can easily conclude that both income and wealth inequalities
decrease whether in the short or the long run. This is because the HP house-
holds’ income and wealth levels remain at the closed-economy steady state
while the LP households gain greater income and wealth via remittances from
family members working abroad.
Proposition 1 In the high inequality case, where α ≥ 1 + w∗ − c, wealth as well as
income inequalities are reduced once migration becomes possible. This result holds true
both in the short and the long runs. In fact, inequalities decline along the time-span,







Proof. See Appendix C.
5.2 Other Cases
In the higher- and lower-medium inequality cases as well as the low inequality
one, both types of households beneﬁt from remittances sent back by family
members working abroads. Therefore, the effects on inequalities are not as
clear-cut as in the high inequality case. However, we ﬁnd that all the three
cases generate the same properties in terms of inequality, despite the fact that
the proofs of these properties differ greatly from case to case.
17Proposition 2 (Effects on the wealth inequality) In the higher-medium, the
lower-medium, and the low inequality cases, migration and remittances reduce the






Proof. See Appendix D.
Proposition 3 (Effects on the income inequality) In the higher-medium, the
lower-medium, and the low inequality cases, it is uncertain whether the income in-




0, ∀α < 1 + w∗ − c. In the





Proof. See Appendix E.
Therefore, in the cases where the income inequality rises in the short
run, our model generates the inverse U-shaped pattern between migra-
tion/remittances and inequality, the same end result described by the migra-
tion network theory. However, we need not endogenize migration costs in or-
der for the disadvantaged households to overcome their liquidity constraints.
Instead, they do so simply via intergenerational wealth accumulation. As
shown in the proofs for Proposition 3, we ﬁnd that the closer α goes toward
the subsistence level of consumption, the more likely we will have this inverse
U-shaped relationship.12 Figure 1 best illustrates the reasons behind.
This ﬁgure shows the income and the wealth dynamics in a low-inequality
example, with the LP productivity set to a very low level. In the beginning of
the open economy, the LP households are severely constrained by their little
familial wealth since most of their agricultural production was used to satisfy
the subsistence needs. Thus, unlike their wealthier HP counterparts who can
already capitalize to a large extent on the access to migration, the LP house-
holds are only able to send out few migrants to earn the high foreign wage.
12From numerical simulations, we also observe rising income inequality in the short run, when
α is sufﬁciently close to α. That is to say, in a sufﬁciently ”equalized” closed economy, the access
to migration could trigger higher income inequality in the short run.
18Figure 1: Income and wealth dynamics (low inequality case): from top to bot-
tom, the four curves respectively represent the income dynamics for the HP
household, then for the LP household, and the wealth dynamics for the HP
household, then for the LP household. (α = 4, α = 2.6, xm = 2,σ0.25, w∗ =
7.5, c = 1.5.)
Consequently, the income inequality rises. In more technical terms, the HP
households’ income quickly converges toward its open-economy steady state
whereas the speed of convergence is by far slower for the LP households. This
is exactly what causes the bump of income inequality in Figure 2, which corre-
sponds to Figure 1.
Later on, while the increase in income becomes negligible for the HP house-
holds, the LP households have accumulated more wealth to relax their liquid-
ityconstraint. Hence, theybecomemoreandmorecapableofsendingmigrants
abroad to raise the household income level. Finally, even though wealth accu-
mulation also slows down for the LP households, the catch-up continues due
to the difference in their speeds of convergence to the respective steady states.
That is why after some point we observe a continuing decline in income in-
equality.










Figure 2: Interhousehold inequalities (low inequality case): the dotted curve
represents the dynamics of the wealth inequality while the starred curve de-
picts that of the income inequality. In the short run, the income inequality may
rise when the LP households are severely constrained by little familial wealth.
The same reasoning also applies to the lower- and higher-medium inequal-
ity cases for the possible rise in income inequality in the short run. In the lower-
medium inequality case, the short-run dynamics is identical to that in the low
inequality case, and in the higher-medium inequality case, the HP households’
income jumps to the new steady state as soon as the frontier is open whereas
the LP households are not yet able to beneﬁt much in the beginning.
Corollary 1 In an economy without local labor market, migration and remittances
are most likely to generate an inverse U-shaped pattern in terms of income inequality
when (i) the LP household is sufﬁciently poor in the closed economy, and (ii) the initial
inequality is not too high so that HP households have incentives to send at least some
migrants out.
In contrast, we observe a constant decline of wealth inequality in Figure 2,
thanks to migration and remittances. The reason is straightforward. Since the
initial wealth of the LP households is only slightly above zero, a small absolute
amount of wealth increase is enough to lower the wealth inequality Γb
t = bt
bt.
20We could of course also measure the inter-household inequality in terms of
utility. Due to our Cobb-Douglas setting, the utility-inequality ratio equals to
the wealth-inequality ratio (Γu
t = ut
ut = Γb
t). Hence, as concluded in Proposition
2, the utility inequality is reduced in all cases, whether in the short or in the
long runs.
5.3 The Gini Coefﬁcient
One may wonder whether our theory would still be robust once we replace the
inter-household measure of income inequality with the empirically-used Gini
coefﬁcient, which takes into account the initial population composition and the
subsequent population changes due to migration. Below, we will show that the
use of Gini coefﬁcient does not at all exclude the possibility of rising income
inequality in the short-run. Let us assume that, at each period of time, there are
ρ units of LP households for each unit of HP household. By the deﬁnition of
the Gini coefﬁcient, we can construct another measure Gt to gauge the income















t , or the ratio of the remaining members of the HP households
to that of the LP households. We do not consider the migrated population
in this inequality measure because, in most cases, they are no more included
in the census data, where the Gini coefﬁcient is derived from. If instead, we
include the migrants, then φt = 1,∀t and we would ﬁnd that the Gini coefﬁ-





t |φt=1 > 0. Accordingly, the
propositions about the income inequality are preserved.
However, φt doesnotstayconstantovertimeonceweexcludethemigrants,
and so to study the dynamics of the Gini coefﬁcient in the open economy we
have to consider the joint effects of Γ
y
t and φt. With numerical simulations, we
13See Appendix F.

















Figure 3: Gini coefﬁcient (low inequality case): using the Gini coefﬁcient as
another inequality measure, we may still ﬁnd the presence of the inverse U-
shaped relationship between migration/remittances and income inequality.
ﬁnd that the inverse U-shaped pattern may be preserved, especially when the
difference in agricultural productivity is small. Figure 3, which corresponds to
the same scenario as the two ﬁgures above and with ρ = 1.5, presents such an
example of our simulation.
6 Extension: Local Labor Market
In this section, we introduce general equilibrium effects in the form of a local
labor market into our agricultural economy. The LP households may choose
to work on the HP farm if the wage rate offered (wt) is higher than their
marginal productivity on own farm. As a result, both households enjoy higher
income and thus higher wealth when compared to an economy without labor
exchange; nevertheless, changesininequalitiesarenotaprioriclear. Hence, we
would like to investigate below: i) whether there is still an inverse U-shaped
relationship between migration and income inequality over time; ii) whether
long-run income inequality always falls under the closed-economy level, as
22observed in the economy without local labor market.
6.1 Closed Economy



















0 if wt ≥ α − 1
α − 1 − wt if wt < α − 1

















> > > > <
> > > > :
0 if wt ≤ α − 1
1 − (α − wt) if α − 1 < wt ≤ α
1 if wt > α
Recall that there are ρ LP households per HP household. Therefore, at the






ρ . Using the labor demand and supply
conditions, we ﬁnd that, if the HP productivity (α) is not too much higher
than the LP productivity (α) and/or if the LP population is relatively large,
then only some of the LP household members work on the HP farm and the
equilibrium wage rate is lower than α. Otherwise, all LP members work on
the HP farm and receive a wage at least as high as the LP households’ highest
marginal productivity α. In short, the two possible labor market equilibria,
denoted as CS and CA respectively, are:




1+ρ and wt = α − (1 − n∗
t)
[CA] when α ≥ 1 + ρ + α,
n∗
t = 1 and wt = α − (1 + ρ)
Since the labor market equilibrium in the closed economy is time-invairant,











































t,wt) being the CS or the CA labor market equilibrium.
6.2 Open Economy: with Access to Migration
From our discussion on the open economy without labor exchange, we have
learned that when the HP productivity is so high that α ≥ 1 + w∗ − c, the HP
households do not send out any migrants and inequalities must fall whether
in the short- or the long-run. Hence, in this section we restrict our attention
within α < 1 + w∗ − c such that mt 6= 0. As before, we enforce the condition
mt 6= 1; that is, the HP household is always constrained if α < w∗ − c.





yt = α(1 + nd












0 < mt < 1






0 if wt ≥ α − (1 − mt)
α − (1 − mt) − wt if wt < α − (1 − mt)
For the LP households, we maintain the assumption that they are always liq-
uidity constrained so that mt =
bt
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> > > > :





c − (α − wt) if α − (1 −
bt
c ) < wt ≤ α
1 −
bt
c if wt > α
Similar to the closed economy, there are two possible labor market equilib-
ria. In the ﬁrst one, denoted as OS, some of the remaining LP family members
work for the HP households, and in the second one, denoted as OA, everyone
who remains behind works on the HP farm. Listed below are the equilibrium
amounts of exchanged labor and their corresponding wage rates.15
For the equilibrium [OS], which applies when α ≤ (1 − mt) + ρ(1 −
bt
c ) + α:
14In fact, when wt = w∗ − c, we can have mt 6= 1 without assuming that LP households are
always liquidity constrained. However, this requires the LP population to be sufﬁciently small
and α to be sufﬁciently large such that they satisfy ρ < α − (w∗ − c) < 1. Moreover, we cannot
exclude the possibility that mt = 1. Therefore, we forgo this case and simply assume that the LP
households are liquidity constrained at all times.
15mt = argmax

yt = α(1 + ρn∗




twt + mt(w∗ − c)

if the HP










where mt = bt









For the equilibrium [OA], which applies when α > (1 − mt) + ρ(1 −
bt
c ) + α:
n∗
t = 1 −
bt
c and wt = α − 1 + mt − ρn∗
t
where mt = bt
c if the HP household is liquidity constrained;
mt = 1 + w∗ − c − α otherwise.
How does the local labor market equilibrium change in response to migra-
tion? Since (1−mt)+ρ(1−
bt
c )+α < 1+ρ+α, if the labor market equilibrium
in the closed economy is CA, where α ≥ 1+ρ+α, then after opening to migra-
tion, the equilibrium must change to OA. In other words, if everybody works
on the HP farm before migration becomes a possibility, then afterwards, all
the remaining LP members will still work for the HP households. Otherwise,
when the closed-economy equilibrium is CS, it may change to either OS or OA
in the short run. With less and less labor supply as the LP household sends out
increasing number of migrants, the equilibrium may maintain within the same
type, or start at OS and end up at OA in the long run. Hence, even if produc-
tive in the closed economy, the LP farm may be abandoned permanently after
migration becomes possible.
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c (w∗ − c) + bt − xm
with (n∗
t,wt) being the OS or the OA labor market equilibrium.
6.3 Evolution of Inter-household Inequalities
In order to answer the questions that we raised in the beginning of this sec-
tion: i) is there still an inverse U-shaped relationship between migration and
income inequality over time? and ii) does long-run income inequality always
fall under the closed-economy level? We resort to numerical simulation using
equations (5), (6), (7), and (8). We ﬁx xm = 2, c = 1.5, w∗ = 7.5 with three
different values of ρ so that we create three scenarios where the LP population
can be smaller (ρ = 0.5), equal (ρ = 1), or larger (ρ = 1.5) than their HP coun-
terpart. In addition, we experiment with different values of α, and we vary σ
and α within the ranges that satisfy our assumptions.
We ﬁnd that, after introducing a local labor market, we may still observe
the inverse U-shaped pattern. Recall that without labor market, the condition
for observing such a pattern was that α must be close enough to the subsistence
level. In fact, the existence of a Kuznets curve now requires α to be even closer
to the subsistence level. Additionally, it also requires that α is sufﬁciently low,
or not too much higher than α. This acts to minimizes the positive effect of la-
bor exchange on the LP household’s income: with lower productivity, the HP
household offers lower wage and hires less LP workers.16 Under such circum-
stances, the LP household is very much constrained in the beginning to beneﬁt
16More rigorously speaking, the equilibrium wage (wt) and/or hired labor (n∗
t) decrease with
the HP household’s productivity (α).
27from the access to migration.
Corollary 2 In an economy with a local labor market, migration and remittances are
most likely to generate an inverse U-shaped pattern in an originally impoverished com-
munity, where both the LP and HP households are living close to the subsistence level
before migration becomes possible.
More importantly, we ﬁnd that with a Kuznets curve, the income inequal-
ity falls but may not fall under the closed-economy level in the long-run (see
ﬁgure 4(a)). In other words, the access to migration may worsen the income
inequality for good, which is a very different result from Proposition 3. The rea-
son is that, with labor exchange, the HP households incur lower opportunity
costs of migration than without: they are able to, at least partly, compensate for
their loss of labor by employing the LP family members for their agricultural
production. In contrast, although the LP household also beneﬁts from migra-
tion and labor exchange, the gains are limited due to a tight liquidity constraint
and low equilibrium wage rates.17
Proposition 4 (Increased income inequality in the long run) With the exis-
tence of a local labor market, when α is sufﬁciently close to α, the income inequality is




Proof. See Appendix G.
WealsoexaminethecorrespondingGinicoefﬁcients, andasshowninﬁgure
4, they exhibit the same pattern as measured by the inter-household income
inequality except for the median case (b) where there is an overshooting of
decreased inequality at the beginning. This seems paradoxical if we look at the
corresponding income dynamics: we observe that the timing of overshooting
corresponds exactly to the overshooting of the HP household’s income. This is
because, at the beginning of the open economy, the HP household gains by a
large amount from sending many members abroad while enjoying a still low
17Even though equilibrium wage rates go up with migration due to rising demand and reduc-































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































29wage rate at home. Since the Gini coefﬁcient takes into account only the
remaining population, it creates the phenomenon that income inequality is
sharply reduced right after opening the border. However, in terms of what we
are concerned of, the Gini coefﬁcient in this case also demonstrates the same
result as does the inter-household inequality measure; that is, the income in-
equality is decreased both in the short- and the long-runs.
The last interesting note is that migration and remittances are not always
Pareto-improving in an economy with a local labor market. When the HP
household’s productivity is so high that they do not beneﬁt much from mi-
gration opportunities, the opening of frontier actually makes them worse off
because the equilibrium wage rate hikes up due to decreasing labor supply.
These decreases in HP household’s absolute income and wealth can be ob-
served for the low-inequality case in ﬁgure 4(a).
7 Conclusion
Thedynamicfameworkproposedinthispaperdemonstratesthattheimpactof
migration and remittances on inequalities in the migrants’ origin communities
largely depends on the difference in their initial endowments of non-liquiﬁable
capital. These endowments translate into different productivity levels and in
turn determine migration incentives and opportunities, and they also affect the
exact way in which remittances and labor markets respond to migration. Com-
bined together, the global effects eventually determine the intergenerational
transmission of wealth across households.
The main results of the analysis may be summarized as follows. First,
whether in the short or the long runs, migration and remittances always re-
duce wealth inequality, through a proportionally larger increase in wealth for
the poor. Second, except when the inequality in productivity is sufﬁciently
high, income inequality may decrease continuously over time or be character-
ized by a ”trickle-down” transition path. In the latter case, income inequality
30rises in the short-run and then subsides after some period of time. That is to
say, an inverse U-shaped relationship may be generated via intergenerational
wealth transfers, which is true with either the inter-household inequality mea-
sure or the Gini coefﬁcient. We ﬁnd that this case is most likely to occur when
low-productivity households are sufﬁciently poor in the economy without la-
bor exchange, or when both low- and high-productivity households are rather
indigent in a closed economy with local exchange. Third, in the long run, mi-
gration and remittances are shown to decrease income inequality in an econ-
omy without labor exchange. However, when a local labor market exists and
the income inequality is increased in the short run, the deteriorated inequal-
ity may never recover to its closed-economy level, when migration was not
possible.
The ﬁrst two results imply that migration network effects are not a neces-
saryconditionforobservinganinverseU-shapedpattern, andtheyhavestrong
implications for the empirical analysis of the migration-inequality relationship.
An immediate implication is that domestic income sources should be treated
as endogenous, as advocated for example by Adams (1989), Taylor (1992) or
Braham and Boucher (1998). Indeed, our results suggest that studies based on
Gini Index decompositions with exogenous distributions of domestic incomes
may yield biased estimates of the inequality impact of migration, with the di-
rection of the bias being theoretically uncertain and depending on the initial
distribution of wealth. This also suggests that the lack of consensus in the em-
pirical literature on the inequality impact of migration may be partly explained
by the omission of labor market responses. Indeed, in a country such as Mex-
ico where inequality is high by international standards, this omission is likely
to lead to an underestimation of the inequality-reducing effect of migration,
but not to a reversal of the sign of the effect. By contrast, in a country such as
Yugoslavia where inequality is much lower, taking labor market responses into
account could possibly reverse the conclusions on the inequality-enhancing ef-
fect of remittances (Milanovic, 1987).
31Finally, our model suggests that the usual hypothesis of migrant network
effects must be tested for directly rather than inferred from the observation of
lower inequality levels within communities with a longer migration tradition.
Indeed, as explained, our framework generates the possibility of an inverse
U-shaped relationship between migration/remittances and inequality. This is
consistent with the ﬁndings of the related empirical literature, but offers a dif-
ferent explanation based on the dynamic accumulation of wealth across gener-
ations, with no need to endogenize migration costs through network effects.
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8 Appendices
A Proof for Lemma 1
We know that at the steady state bt+1 = bt for equation (3), which has two










(w∗ − α −
c
σ





is stable. From our formulation of the utility function, it is clear that wealth
should be always positive, and it is straightforward to show that this stable
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⇔ w∗ − xm <
c
σ
(or σ < c
w∗−xm)
34Armed with this condition, now we can prove that this stable steady state is
a real solution, that is, (w∗−α− c
σ)2+2(w∗−xm− c
σ) ≥ 0. Rewrite the inequality
above as
£ c




σ − (w∗ − xm)
¤
. With the assumption xm <
α − 1
2, it is sufﬁcient to show that
£ c













Since the last inequality always holds, we conclude that b
m
ss is indeed real.
B Computations for α0 and α1 in Lemma 2
We derive α1 simply from c(1 + w∗ − c − α) = b1 = σ
1−σ(α − 1
2 − xm). Simi-







2 + α − 1
2 − xm
i
. This equality leads to











We eliminate the other root that is certainly positive because w∗ − c − α0 < 0
in this scenario, but we still have to check if this root is negative. We ﬁnd that
with w∗ − xm < c
σ, the condition we derive in Lemma 1, it is indeed negative.
After some rearrangements, we have α0 as shown in Lemma 2.
35C Proof for Proposition 1
In order to prove that the wealth inequality abates in the high inequality case,
we need to show that Γb
t+1 − Γb






















it sufﬁces to demonstrate that b1 − bt+1 < 0. Using equations (1) and (3), we
know that b1 < b2. From this as well as the functional properties of bt+1(bt)
and Lemma 1, we conclude that b1 < b2 < ··· < bss. That is to say, (b1 − bt+1)
is indeed negative.



























so it sufﬁces to show that y
0−y
t < 0, which is evident by comparing equations
(1) and (2).
D Proofs for Proposition 2
D.1 Higher-Medium Inequality Case
In order to conﬁrm that the wealth inequality is reduced in the short run, we






2(1 + w∗ − c − α)2 + α − 1





2 − xm +
b1









36After some rearrangements, we know that it is equivalent to demonstrate the
following to be true.













Denoting the left-hand side of the inequality as f(α), one ﬁnds that
∂f(α)




c(1−σ)+σ , the minimal value of α. Thereby, it is sufﬁcient to
show that f(αmin) < 0. Again after some rearrangements, we ﬁnd that to
determine the sign of f(αmin) is equivalent to know the sign of













where g(α) monotonically increases in α, ∀c, σ, α. By assumption, 1
2 + xm <
α < w∗ −c; thus, as long as we can prove g(w∗ −c) < 0, it immediately implies
that g(α) < 0, ∀α. With
g(w∗ − c) = (2 +
σ
c(1 − σ)







and w∗ − xm < c
σ by Lemma 1, g(w∗ − c) is indeed negative. Hence, we have
proven that wealth inequality is reduced in the short run.
The proof for the long-run wealth inequality can be found in the proof for
the next case.
D.2 Lower-Medium Inequality Case
The proof for the short-run wealth inequality is identical to that of the low
inequality case (see below).
In order to conﬁrm that the wealth inequality is reduced in the long run, we
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After some rearrangements, we know that it is equivalent to demonstrate the
following to be true.












(w∗ − α − c
σ)2 + 2(w∗ − xm − c
σ).
Denoting the left-hand side of the inequality as f(α), one ﬁnds that
∂f(α)
∂α ≤
0,∀α ∈]α, 1 + w∗ − c[. In other words, f(α) reaches its maximum when α =











Thereby, it is sufﬁcient to demonstrate that f(αmin) < 0. Again after some
rearrangements, we ﬁnd that to determine the sign of f(αmin) is equivalent to
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∂α2 > 0, ∀α ∈ <, or g(·) is a convex function in α. Moreover,
g(xm+ 1
2) < g(αmin) = 0 while xm+ 1
2 < α < w∗−c < αmin. Thus, we conclude
that g(α) < 0, and so we have proven that wealth inequality is reduced in the
long run. Since this result is valid for w∗ − c + B ≤ α < 1 + w∗ − c, the proof
above also applies to the higher-medium inequality case.
D.3 Low Inequality Case
In order to know whether the wealth inequality is reduced in the short run, we
look at the sign of Γb
2 − Γb











) · (α − α)
38which is obviously negative and indicates that the wealth inequality is indeed
reduced in the short run.
To demonstrate that the wealth inequality is also reduced in the long run,
let us ﬁrst write













with bss = f(bss,α), which implies bss = b(α). Thus, we can deﬁne that at
b = bss, g(b,α) = f(b(α),α) − b(α) = 0. From the function form of f(·), we
know
∂g


































Suppose α = α, the right hand side (RHS) of the second inequality is equal to
the left hand side (LHS). Hence, in order to prove our speculation to be true, it
sufﬁces to show that ∂LHS
∂α < ∂RHS
∂α = 0 holds for all α > α. In other words,
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c (α − 1
2 − xm)
Since the last inequality always holds, we have proven our case.
39E Proof for Proposition 3
E.1 Higher-Medium Inequality Case




















whose sign is the same as that of the following equation:
f(α) =










Obviously as α → (1 + w∗ − c), the upper bound of α, we have f(α) < 0.





c(1−σ)+σ . We know that to determine the sign of
f(αmin) is equivalent to look at the sign of the equation below.
g(α) =
(α − 1






















where max(1,xm + 1
2) < α < w∗ − c. In the case where xm > 1
2, we have
g(α) > 0 as α → (xm + 1
2), the lower bound of α. It therefore implies that
limα→(xm+ 1
2) f(αmin) > 0.
Because we have shown above that the sign of f(α) varies with the parame-
ter values, we conclude that the effect of migration and remittances on income
equality is ambiguous in the short run.
The proof for the long-run income inequality can be found in the proof for
the next case.
40E.2 Lower-Medium Inequality Case
To know whether the income inequality increases or decreases in the short run,





















Since we have derived the wealth levels at t = 1, after some rearrangements,
we know it is equivalent to look at the sign of
f(α,α) =
(α − 1















2) f(·) > 0. However, f(·) does not always stay positive.





















∂ α2 < 0, ∀α > 1
2. Second, f(α) = 0 has two solutions: αw∗ − c









. When we choose a parameter set such
that the second root is smaller than the ﬁrst one, both roots are then smaller
than α0. So, this strictly concave function f(α) is negative within the range of
α, which implies that the income inequality is reduced in the short run.
In order to conﬁrm that the income inequality is reduced in the long run,






















The rest of the proof is very similar to the proof for the wealth inequality
in the long run. We can also rearrange this inequality so that it sufﬁces to
41demonstrate that the function f(αmin) < 0, which in turn is equivalent to show










∂α2 > 0, ∀α ∈ <, or g(·) is a convex function in α. Moreover,
g(1
2) < g(αmin) = 0 while 1
2 < xm+ 1
2 < α < w∗−c < αmin. Thus, we conclude
that g(α) < 0, and so we have proven that income inequality is reduced in the
long run. Since this result is valid for w∗ − c + B ≤ α < 1 + w∗ − c, the proof
above also applies to the higher-medium inequality case.
E.3 Low Inequality Case
Since in the short run, the income dynamics is the same for the low and
the lower-medium inequality cases, we can follow the same steps in the
last case to show that the income inequality may rise in the short run (i.e.
limα→(xm+ 1
2) f(·) > 0). However, the effect is not certainly positive. For ex-





















∂ α2 > 0, ∀α > 1
2. Second, f(α) = 0 has two solutions: α = w∗ − c










2 + xm). We can choose a set of
parameter values such that the second root is smaller than the ﬁrst one. So,
we can ensure that the strictly convex function f(α) is negative, which implies
that the income inequality is reduced in the short run, for all α located within
these two roots.
To prove that income inequality is reduced in the long run, we ﬁrstly
42rewrite ym
ss as xm + ( 1
σ − 1)bm
ss, so it is equivalent to demonstrate that



























Suppose α = α, the right hand side (RHS) of the second inequality is equal to
the left hand side (LHS). Thus, it sufﬁces to show that ∂LHS
∂α < ∂RHS
∂α = 0 holds










w∗ − α − c
σ p
(w∗ − α − c













Following the deﬁnition of the Gini coefﬁcient that it is the ratio of area be-
tween the Lorenz curve and the uniform distribution of income to the whole
area under the uniform distribution, we have
Gt = 1 −
1
2 · ρ2 · y
t(1 − m∗
t)2 + 1
2 · yt(1 − m∗





2 [ρ(1 − m∗














t . After some computations, we obtain the Gini coefﬁcient
shown in Section F.
G Proof for Proposition 4
We look at the scenario where the HP household is liquidity constrained (so
mt = bt
c ) and the labor market equilibrium changes from CS in the closed
economy to OS in the open economy, or where there are always some LP fam-
ily members working on their own farm. We choose to examine this type of
transition because it is when α and α are the closest amongst all the possible
transitions of equilibria.
43In order to know whether Γy
ss > Γ
y
























σ )b1 + xm
(1−σ
σ )b1 + xm
which is equivalent to know the sign of Ψ
Ψ = b
m














































Next, we derive b
m
ss as a function of b
m
ss from the LP household’s wealth
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= (1 + ρ)
q
1 + 2 · ( c
σ − w∗ + α − 1) · c
bm
ss − 2 · (α − xm − 1


















With the two relationships we just obtained above, we can now rewrite Ψ:
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−2 · (α−xm− 1
2) > 0
Hence, we have proved that when α is sufﬁciently close to α, the income in-




In ﬁgure 5, where we choose identical parameter values to those in ﬁgure
4, we actually observe that Ψ is positive, or the long-run income inequality is

















b  − Γ
1
b
Figure 5: The income inequality is increased in the long run when α is sufﬁ-
ciently close to α (α = 2.6, σ = 0.25, xm = 2, c = 1.5, w∗ = 7.5, ρ = 1.5).
45